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Doctrinal Conversation: Justice Kagan’s Supreme Court 
Opinions 
LAURA KRUGMAN RAY* 
Confirmation hearings are sometimes memorable for their moments of high 
drama, as in Clarence Thomas’s fiery attack on the Senate Judiciary Committee,1 or 
apparent blunders, as in Robert Bork’s seeming rejection of a major Supreme Court 
desegregation decision,2 or flashes of human emotion, as in Martha-Ann Alito’s 
tearful departure after her husband was asked a provocative question.3 In contrast, 
Elena Kagan’s confirmation hearing is likely to be remembered for something quite 
different: the nominee’s humorous comments that the transcript repeatedly records 
as followed by “[Laughter.]”4 When, in a lead-in to a question about an attempted 
terrorist attack, South Carolina Republican Senator Lindsey Graham asked Kagan 
where she was on Christmas Day, she famously replied “You know, like all Jews, I 
was probably at a Chinese Restaurant.”5 Graham, presumably startled, was 
nonetheless appreciative, responding “Great answer. Great answer,” before 
returning to his serious theme.6  
Kagan’s humorous comments were not simply isolated jokes intended to lighten 
the hearing’s atmosphere. They served as well to build bridges between the 
nominee and her examiners, to inject a human element into what at times showed 
signs of becoming an adversarial process, and to create a rapport with observers as 
well as Judiciary Committee members of both parties. Questioned about her law 
review article calling for substantive exchanges between senators and Supreme 
Court nominees, Kagan was quick to acknowledge the tension between that article 
and her reticence in providing specific answers. When Senator Patrick Leahy noted 
of the article that “[y]ou probably reread those words,” Kagan replied “Many times. 
. . . And you know what? They have been read back to me many times.”7 Asked by 
Senator Grassley about a thesis she wrote as a student at Oxford University, Kagan 
was candidly ironic: “Senator Grassley,” she replied, “all I can say about that paper 
is that it’s – it’s dangerous to write papers about the law before you’ve spent a day 
        †   Copyright © Laura Krugman Ray 2013. 
 * Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; J.D., Ph.D., Yale University; 
A.B., Bryn Mawr College. I am grateful to Jean Eggen and Philip Ray for their valuable 
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
 1. Jane Mayer & Jill Abramson, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE 
THOMAS 289–90 (1994). 
 2. Ethan Bronner, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 
232–33 (1989).  
 3. Neil A. Lewis, Court in Transition: In the Background; An Intense Experience for 
Family Members, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2006, at A27. 
 4. 23 Hearings and Reports on Successful and Unsuccessful Nominations of Supreme 
Court Justices by the Senate Judiciary Committee 1916-2010, at 62, 79, 88, 95, 118, 128, 
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 6. Id. 
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in law school.”8 Toward the close of her second and final day of testimony, when 
Senator Coburn prefaced a question by noting that “I’m 12 or 13 years older than 
you,” Kagan responded “Maybe not after this hearing.”9 And when Senator 
Klobuchar intervened briefly to correct a point she had made only minutes earlier 
about the number of women senators elected in past years, Kagan was quick to 
sympathize. “Isn’t email a wonderful thing,” she said. “You can learn you’re wrong 
right away.”10 It is not surprising that even Senator Arlen Specter, who earlier 
scolded Kagan for evading his questions, ended by complimenting her.11 “You 
have shown a really admirable sense of humor,” he told her. “I think that is really 
important.”12  
Kagan’s tendency to lower the temperature of an inherently adversarial situation 
by connecting with her audience has not been confined to her confirmation hearing. 
It has become as well a hallmark of her opinions. Whether she is writing for the 
Court, concurring, or dissenting, Kagan’s style is remarkably conversational. She 
employs a range of rhetorical strategies to speak directly to the reader, suggesting 
that her enterprise is less indoctrination than a more congenial mode of persuasion. 
Leavening her legal prose with colloquial diction, she engages the reader in 
something approaching an informational, if one-sided, chat. I have elsewhere 
characterized Justice Scalia’s distinctive rhetorical style as “indignant 
conversation,” speaking to the reader in the voice of “a man of common sense 
whose patience is tried beyond endurance by the follies of his colleagues.”13 
Kagan’s variety of conversation is quite different in tone: genial rather than 
indignant, seeking to enlighten rather than to chastise those who disagree with her. 
Her judicial prose might aptly be called friendly pedagogy, an approach that seems 
to offer the reader a glimpse of the author as she once was in her professorial role. 
This similarity is scarcely surprising. Kagan herself has said that “I approach 
opinion writing much as I used to approach the classroom,”14 and her judicial prose 
contains numerous strategies of engagement between author and reader that recall 
the strategies of a gifted teacher. 
More than two dozen times in her first two terms on the Court, Kagan opens a 
sentence with a direct invocation to the reader, much as a teacher addresses her 
students. Sometimes the opening is a simple “Recall” or “Remember,” to prompt 
 8. Id. at 128. 
 9. Id. at 281. 
 10. Id. at 292. 
 11. For example, dissatisfied with Kagan’s response to his question about the deference 
owed by the Court to Congress, Specter interrupted her reply: “Ms. Kagan, I know what you 
said. You have talked about that a great deal. My question is very pointed. Wasn’t that 
disrespectful?” When she tried again to respond, he again interrupted her: “I’m going to 
move on. I know all of that. The point that I’m trying to find out from you is what deference 
you would show to Congressional fact finding.” Id. at 132. 
 12. Id. at 136. 
 13. Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in Supreme Court 
Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 227 (2002). 
 14. Interview with Dean Wendy Purdue, University of Richmond School of Law, 
September 20, 2012. http://www.c-span.org/Events/Conversation-with-Supreme-Court-
Justice-Elena-Kagan/10737434240-1/. 
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the reader’s memory about the facts of the case or an argument made by the other 
side.15 At other times she asks a bit more of the reader: to consider a different slant 
on an issue or suppose an invented situation. That may take the basic form of a 
simple request, like “Consider first”16 or “Consider a prosaic example.”17 Or it may 
place a heavier demand, asking the reader to go beyond the facts of the case to 
examine a hypothetical sequence of events (“First suppose. . . . But now suppose. . . 
.”).18 That demand may become quite personal, as when she asks the reader to 
“[s]uppose your spouse tells you that he got lost because he ‘did not make a 
turn.’”19 She may even offer directions for the mental process required, as when 
she asks the reader to “[p]ut on blinders” and then later “take off” those 
blinders,20or when she commands “[b]ut now stop a moment” to reflect on the 
importance of context in interpreting the phrase “not an.”21 She may ask for an 
even greater leap, instructing the reader to “Imagine”22 or, more precisely, to 
“Pretend.” The latter injunction introduces a detailed exchange with the reader in 
Kagan’s dissent from the majority’s rejection of a campaign finance matching fund 
provision as unconstitutional: 
Pretend you are financing your campaign through private donations. 
Would you prefer that your opponent receive a guaranteed, upfront 
payment of $150,000, or that he receive only $50,000, with the 
possibility a possibility that you mostly get to control - of collecting 
another $100,000 somewhere down the road? Me too. That’s the first 
reason the burden on speech cannot command a different result in this 
case than in Buckley.23 
Kagan puts the reader in the shoes of the candidate whose own expenditures would 
determine the size of the matching payments to his opponent. Her colloquial two 
 15. See, e.g., “Recall that the FMIA’s regulations provide for the inspection of all pigs 
at delivery,” Nat’l Meat Ass’n. v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 971 (2012); “Remember: Indiana 
has made a purposeful choice to divide the full spectrum of vehicular flight into different 
degrees,” Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2292 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 16. “Consider first what the two statutes tell a slaughterhouse to do . . . ,” Nat’l Meat, 
132 S. Ct. at 970. 
 17. “Consider a prosaic example not involving scientific experts,” Williams v. Illinois, 
132 S. Ct. 2221, 2269 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 18. “First, suppose Patchak had sued under the APA claiming that he owned the Bradley 
Property . . . . But now suppose that Patchak had sued under the APA claiming only that use 
of the Bradley Property was causing environmental harm,” Match-E-Be-She-Wish Band of 
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (2012). 
 19. Caraco Pharm. Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1681 (2012). 
 20. “Put on blinders, and the subsection is naturally understood to address all flight, up 
to and including the most dangerous kinds. But take off those blinders – view the statute as a 
whole – and the subsection is instead seen to target failures to stop. Sykes, 132 S. Ct. at 2293. 
 21. Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1681. 
 22. “Imagine the converse of the statute described above,” Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2291 
(Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 23. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2838 
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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word agreement with the anticipated answer – “Me too” – draws dissenter and 
reader into a friendly alliance before she caps the argument with the authority of 
precedent.  
Kagan may also, at times, go beyond these one-size-fits-all instructions to single 
out or even flatter her readers, a strategy of classroom encouragement. When she 
observes that “[c]areful readers may note …,” she is focusing her readers’ attention 
by complimenting their powers of observation.24 And in the same case she then 
observes that “[t]hose mathematically inclined might think of the comparable-
grounds approach as employing Venn diagrams,” drawing those eager to accept the 
compliment into a visual image used to illustrate a statutory provision.25 In the 
inverse of that flattery, she may instead encourage her readers to question the 
resolution of a technical issue involving scientific test results by providing them 
with a more accessible approach. Dissenting from a Court opinion accepting 
laboratory evidence without the testimony of the technician involved, Kagan 
substitutes a simple analogy. “Consider a prosaic example,” she asks, in which a 
police officer testifies to what an absent eyewitness told him, suggesting that 
common sense rather than technical expertise is sufficient to undermine the 
majority’s position.26  
Kagan enhances the conversational quality of her opinions with a generous 
sprinkling of informal and even colloquial diction, speaking in the language of her 
readers much as a teacher might speak in the language of her students. Writing for a 
unanimous Court in her first term, she puts her own stamp on a brief opinion by 
referring to a “faux complaint” made against a police chief,27 a “downright lucky 
assertion” of a claim,28 and “green-eyeshade accountants.”29 In subsequent 
opinions she has characterized an amicus’ argument as “a kind of loosey-goosey 
caution not to put too much faith in the capacity of prisons to rehabilitate,”30 
reported an increase in campaign expenditures of “a whopping 253%,”31 rejected a 
claimed injury as barred “[e]xcept in a world gone topsy-turvy,”32 and become the 
second Justice to use the word “chutzpah.”33 She rejects a plurality opinion that in 
her view would have allowed an easy evasion of the Constitution as “a wink and a 
nod.”34 Expanding her point, she argues in a conversational voice: “If the 
Confrontation Clause prevents the State from getting its evidence in through the 
 24. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 482 n.4 (2011). 
 25. Id. at 482. 
 26. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2269 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 27. Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2211 (2011). 
 28. Id. at 2215-16. 
 29. Id. at 2216. 
 30. Tapia v. United States, 131 U.S. 2382, 2387 (2011) (Kagan, J.).  
 31. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2834 
n.2 (2011). 
 32. Id. at 2833. 
 33. “Some people might call that chutzpah.” Id. at 2835 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The first 
to use the word was Justice Scalia, referring to “a particularly high degree of chutzpah.” 
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 597 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment).  
 34. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2270 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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front door, then the State could sneak it in through the back. What a neat trick – but 
really, what a way to run a criminal justice system. No wonder five Justices reject 
it.”35 The plurality’s arguments in support of the reliability of the evidence are met 
with a terse and weary rebuttal: “Been there, done that.”36 Kagan’s rhetorical 
strategy in dissent is one of mockery rather than direct assault, using language to 
puncture rather than to pummel the opposition’s argument. Toward the end of her 
opinion, she concludes that “[w]hat comes out of four Justices’ desire to limit” 
precedent on the admissibility issue “is—to be frank—who knows what.”37 That 
frankness, couched in a colloquial expression of bewilderment, speaks directly to 
the reader as well as to her fellow Justices.  
It is curious that in the same dissent Kagan, for thus far the only time, uses a 
remarkably obscure word, one that has never appeared in any other Supreme Court 
opinion. Criticizing Justice Thomas’s concurrence, she finds that his “approach, if 
accepted, would turn the Confrontation Clause into a constitutional geegaw – nice 
for show, but of little value.”38 “Geegaw” is described in the Oxford English 
Dictionary as a variant of “gewgaw” and defined as “a gaudy trifle, plaything, or 
ornament, a pretty thing of little value, a toy or bauble.”39 Kagan has thus selected 
not only an obscure word but its even more obscure variant to make her point. The 
choice is deliberate: she helpfully provides a definition for the reader who is not 
expected either to know the word or to reach for a historical dictionary to find out 
what it means. The obscurity is presumably the point, a way of underscoring how 
out of step with the Constitution the Thomas approach must be. It is also worth 
noting that the expression itself may remind the reader of Justice Marshall’s 
famous phrase in McCulloch v. Maryland, where he suggests that an incorrect 
interpretation of the Constitution may reduce it to “a splendid bauble.”40 Kagan‘s 
definition – “nice for show, but of little value” – could serve as well for Marshall’s 
phrase, and that is unlikely to be merely fortuitous.  
When Kagan reaches for similes and metaphors outside the legal sphere to 
explain her opinions, she chooses areas of popular culture and sport that are likely 
to be familiar to her readers. In her most extended development of one such figure 
of speech, she compares litigation to its Hollywood versions: 
These standards would be easy to apply if life were like the movies, but 
that is usually not the case. In Hollywood, litigation often concludes 
with a dramatic verdict that leaves one party fully triumphant and the 
other utterly prostrate. The court in such a case would know exactly 
how to award fees (even if that anti-climactic scene is generally left on 
 35. Id. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 2275. 
 37. Id. at 2277. 
 38. Id. at 2276. 
 39. Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1989)), vol. 6, p. 489. Kagan displays her taste 
for obscure diction in another case, when, in discussing “a crime involving turpitude,” she 
uses the adjectival form, “turpitudinous,” a word the Oxford English Dictionary terms 
“literary” and that does not appear elsewhere in the U.S. Reports. The New Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary (1993), vol. 2, p. 3429.  
 40. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). 
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the cutting-room floor). But in the real world, litigation is more 
complex, involving multiple claims for relief that implicate a mix of 
legal theories and have different merits. Some claims succeed; others 
fail. Some charges are frivolous; others (even if not ultimately 
successful) have a reasonable basis. In short, litigation is messy, and 
courts must deal with untidiness in awarding fees.41 
The analogy is prologue to a resolution that allows civil rights litigants to receive 
attorney’s fees for claims that, although unsuccessful, were nonetheless non-
frivolous. On her way to that resolution, Kagan introduces two defendants, “call 
them Vice and Rice,” only one of whom faced both frivolous and non-frivolous 
claims.42 She is deliberately blending reality with her fiction, since Vice is the 
name of one actual defendant in the case, in order to illustrate the basis for the 
Court’s resolution of the “messy” claims issue. Elsewhere, Kagan invokes 
television rather than the movies, describing a case as “little more than a rerun” of 
the relevant precedent.43 In a campaign finance case, she reaches for a fairy tale 
metaphor to explain that “[t]he difficulty, then, is in finding the Goldilocks solution 
– not too large, not too small, but just right.”44 She introduces a history of 
sentencing jurisprudence by noting that “[a]ficionados of our sentencing decisions 
will recognize much of the story line.”45 And she finds that admitting certain 
evidence “would end-run the Confrontation Clause, and make a parody of its 
strictures.”46 The submerged theme of such references is that legal opinions are 
also, like film and fiction, narratives that are most effective when they engage their 
readers. 
In the same spirit, Kagan draws on the vocabulary of gambling to illustrate her 
points. Describing a circuit split on an issue of immigration law, she notes that, 
after two other circuits rejected the Ninth Circuit’s position, it nonetheless 
“doubled down on its contrary view.”47 Explaining the basis for the Court’s 
rejection of a litigant’s interpretation of a statute, she relies on poker terms to 
conclude “[w]e think that sees, raises, and bests Novo’s argument.”48 And, in a 
recurrent metaphor, she compares the Bureau of Immigration Appeals’ method of 
determining whether an alien may be granted discretionary relief from deportation 
to a coin toss. “If,” she observes, “the BIA proposed to narrow the class of 
deportable aliens eligible to seek § 212(c) relief by flipping a coin – heads an alien 
may apply for relief, tails he may not – we would reverse the policy in an 
instant.”49 The statutory distinction relied on is “as extraneous to the merits of the 
case as a coin flip would be.”50 A record of reliance on that policy is unpersuasive 
 41. Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2213-14 (2011).  
 42. Id. at 2215. 
 43. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 (2011). 
 44. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2832 
(2011). 
 45. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (2011). 
 46. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2269 (2012). 
 47. Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (2012). 
 48. Caraco Pharm. Lab., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1682 (2012). 
 49. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 485 (2011). 
 50. Id. at 486. 
                                                                                                                 
 
2012] DOCTRINAL CONVERSATION 7 
 
support since “([t]o use a prior analogy, flipping coins to determine §212(c) 
eligibility would remain as arbitrary on the thousandth try as on the first.”)51 
Finally, she rejects “cheapness” as a rationale to save the policy: “(If it could, 
flipping coins would be a valid way to determine an alien’s eligibility for a 
waiver.)”52 By providing a powerful visual image, the coin toss analogy 
strengthens the Court’s rejection of what it finds an equally arbitrary decision-
making method. Attorneys may enjoy, but do not need, such imagery to understand 
judicial analyses. Kagan seems to include them in part in the hope that she may 
number interested amateurs as well as legal professionals among readers of Court 
opinions.53 
Kagan has other strategies of engagement that she frequently uses to underscore 
an important point. One of her favorites, the use of parenthetical commentary on 
her own argument, has become a signature of her style. These interjections function 
like the asides a speaker uses to establish a bond with a listener – a change of tone 
that suggests a shared sensibility. Kagan may use these parentheticals to strengthen 
a point, as when, writing for the Court to strike down mandatory life sentences 
without parole for juveniles, she describes the special nature of children by 
referring to “their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental 
vulnerabilities”54 and later makes clear the drastic consequence of the rejected 
policy by calling it “a sentence of life (and death) in prison.”55 She questions a 
majority assertion by noting that it is made “(without explaining how this can be 
true)”56 and then debunks the majority’s reliance on language from a government 
website “(written by who-knows-whom?).”57 She may use a parenthetical to 
highlight for the reader what she considers an indisputable point by adding 
 51. Id. at 488. 
 52. Id. at 490. 
 53. It is not surprising that Kagan, known as a fierce New York Mets fan, also uses 
occasional sports imagery, though not always with complete success. She observes that “[a] 
trial court has wide discretion when, but only when, it calls the game by the right rules.” Fox 
v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2217 (2011). She refers approvingly to “[o]ur more essential point” 
that “has less gamesmanship about it.” Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1682. Most emphatically, 
though, she recognizes the limits of her own sports imagery when she concludes her 
campaign finance dissent by insisting that “[t]ruly, democracy is not a game.” Arizona Free 
Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2846. In a particularly vivid dissenting 
passage that combines sport and firearms imagery, Kagan builds her charge against the 
majority: “As against all this, the majority claims to have found three smoking guns that 
reveal the State’s true (and nefarious) intention to level the playing field. But the only smoke 
here is the majority’s and it is the kind that goes with mirrors.” Id. at 2843.  
  On other occasions, Kagan is not quite so successful in avoiding that danger. For 
example, immediately after noting that “the Government also emphasizes the comparable-
grounds rule’s vintage,” she adds that “[a]s an initial matter, we think this is a slender reed to 
support a significant government policy.” Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 488. In the same opinion, 
she observes that “the BIA tried to have it both ways” before concluding that “the BIA’s 
cases were all over the map.” Id. 
 54. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012). 
 55. Id. at 2567. 
 56. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2840. 
 57. Id. at 2844. 
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energetically “(no controversy there!)”58 or, in a tone of mild irony, observe that 
the Quiet Title Act “concerns (no great surprise) quiet title actions.”59 The informal 
language in these two examples serves to draw writer and reader together in their 
shared appreciation of the obvious.  
At other times she uses the parenthetical to characterize or qualify her own 
position. Criticizing the Court’s admission of laboratory test results without the 
analyst’s testimony as a Confrontation Clause violation, she finds that this 
“approach – no less (perhaps more) than the confrontation-free methods of 
presenting forensic evidence we have formerly banned – deprived” the defendant of 
his Sixth Amendment rights.60 When she compares the test applied in this case to 
similar precedent, she finds that any distinction “amounts to (maybe) a nickel’s 
worth of difference” and that “the variances are no more (probably less)” than those 
the Court has earlier rejected.61 Here the parenthetical phrases suggest that she is 
actually more restrained than she might be in rejecting the Court’s position and thus 
a more credible critic. This is the reverse of hyperbole, a deliberate understatement 
offered to the reader as a credential of trustworthiness.  
Kagan employs another rhetorical strategy, a pedagogic staple for making sure 
that an audience is alerted to the important points: the simple but effective device of 
repetition. In the juvenile penalty case, she echoes the Court’s earlier language to 
refute it, finding that “if, as Harmelin recognized, ‘death is different,’ children are 
different too.”62 She repeatedly makes double use of a word or phrase to drive 
home her point: “to avoid avoidance”;63 “courts should think hard, and then think 
hard again”;64 and “differences that make no difference.”65 There may be a slight 
variation, as in “a sentencing judge may never, ever”66 or “we have never, not 
once,”67 but the effect is almost identical. More dramatically, a number of these 
repetitions are triplets, with the key term used three times in close proximity: “In 
First Amendment Law, that difference makes a difference – indeed it makes all the 
difference,”68 and, at greater length, “in authorizing one person to bring one kind of 
suit seeking one form of relief, Congress barred another person from bringing 
another kind of suit seeking another form of relief.”69 More simply, in an opinion 
pointing out the potential consequences of the Court’s avoidance of certain 
qualified immunity claims, Kagan combines two forms of repetition: “Another 
plaintiff brings suit, and another court both awards immunity and bypasses the 
 58. Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1686. 
 59. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 
2199, 2206 (2012). 
 60. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2265. 
 61. Id. at 2276. 
 62. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012). 
 63. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011). 
 64. Id. at 2032. 
 65. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1458 (2011) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting). 
 66. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (2011). 
 67. Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2837. 
 68. Id. at 2839. 
 69. Match-E-Be, 132 S. Ct. at 2209. 
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claim. And again, and again, and again.”70 The effect is to illustrate the substantive 
point by embedding it in the rhetorical structure. 
These rhetorical devices and diction choices combine to produce the 
conversational tone that Kagan has said she works to achieve. In a recent interview 
at the University of Richmond School of Law, she was candid about her stylistic 
goals. “It’s important that my opinions sound like me,” she told the audience, and 
to that end she writes them herself rather than delegating to her law clerks.71 And 
she targets lay readers as well as legal professionals. “I try very hard,” she said of 
her opinion writing, “to make it understandable to a broad audience.” 72 She makes 
clear that her choice of diction is deliberate. “One way” of achieving her goal, she 
has found, is “to drop the legalese and try to express as people would in normal 
conversation.”73 And she often meets that goal. When she feels that her colleagues 
on the other side are misinterpreting her dissent, she observes crisply that “the 
plurality must be reading someone else’s opinion.”74 Responding to the majority’s 
assumption that the Indiana legislature simply forgot to remove a crucial phrase in 
amending a statute, she notes that “if so, the legislature forgot four more times to 
correct its error.”75 These are rejoinders that might easily be heard in ordinary 
conversational sparring. Dissenting from the Court’s acceptance of Arizona’s 
school tuition tax credit plan, she observes that “[i]t is, after all good fun to spend 
other people’s money,” a formulation that would fit comfortably into a family 
financial discussion.76 
Although these separate examples of Kagan’s deliberately colloquial style are 
engaging, the cumulative effect of her rhetorical strategy can be considerably more 
potent. Not surprisingly, that effect appears most emphatically in a spirited dissent 
joined by her three liberal colleagues, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. 
The issue in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett is the 
constitutionality of a state election statute that authorizes the payment of public 
funds to a candidate in order to match threshold amounts spent by a privately 
financed opponent.77 Under the state’s Clean Election Act, a publicly financed 
candidate receives an initial lump-sum to, as Kagan puts it, “get his campaign off 
the ground.”78 As the candidate’s privately financed opponent spends money on his 
campaign, the state matches every dollar with ninety-four cents in public funds, up 
to three times the initial lump-sum payment. The dissenters argue that this scheme 
is both constitutionally valid and practical as a means of preventing corruption or 
its appearance in the election process. 
Having set out the substance of the majority’s position—that the matching fund 
provision has the prohibited effect of restricting speech by the privately funded 
 70. Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2031. 
 71. Interview, supra note 14. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2271 (2012). 
 75. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2295 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 76. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1458 (2011) (Kagan 
J., dissenting). 
 77. 131 S. Ct. at 2813. 
 78. Id. at 2832. 
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candidate, since any money he spends will be matched, up to a point, by the state—
Kagan proceeds to dismantle that argument by speaking directly to the reader. 
Although she writes for three colleagues, Kagan speaks as an individual, repeatedly 
using first person pronouns. Thus, she tells the reader that “I will not quarrel” and 
“My guess is” and “I will take on faith.”79 Even a footnote begins with “I will note” 
and continues in the first person voice, as she insists that “I understand” and “I will 
not belabor the issue.”80 It is here that Kagan directly engages the reader as listener, 
asking him, in a passage quoted earlier, to “[p]retend that you are financing your 
campaign through private donations” and to consider which of two schemes is 
preferable.81 The dissent has now created a conversation of sorts, with the reader 
pressed to play an actively responsive role. The exchange ends with Kagan’s “Me 
too,” assuming that the reader has agreed with her point that even the privately 
financed candidate would choose “mostly” to control the amount his opponent 
receives by controlling how much he himself spends.82  
As she concludes this section of her argument, Kagan again relies on the 
intelligence—and memory—of the reader, noting that “I doubt that I have to 
reiterate that the Arizona statute imposes no restraints on any expressive activity.”83 
She and the reader are by now in perfect agreement. Moreover, the reader is 
complimented for the good sense to see through the majority’s weak rationale for 
striking down the statute. “If an ordinary citizen,” she observes, “without the 
hindrance of a law degree, thought this result an upending of First Amendment 
values, he would be correct.”84 The lay reader is not merely the equal of a majority 
Justice in comprehending the way the statute works. He is actually better able to 
penetrate the fog of legal argument and grasp the right result precisely because he is 
unhampered by the majority’s technical preconceptions. Just as Kagan talks to the 
reader in the language of daily life, she also presents legal issues as practical 
problems that can be solved without sophisticated jurisprudential expertise. All she 
asks of the reader is the application of logic, common sense, and human experience.  
 It is not surprising that Kagan often uses a similarly pragmatic perspective when 
assessing legal standards. Writing for a unanimous Court in Judulang v. Holder85 to 
find the Board of Immigration Appeals’ standard for discretionary relief from 
deportation arbitrary and capricious, she again relies on common sense rather than 
exclusively on legal exegesis. She opens her analysis by announcing that “[t]he 
legal background of this case is complex, but the principle guiding our decision is 
anything but.”86 The syntax of the sentence reinforces its point. The concluding 
phrase, “anything but,” is not only colloquial in tone but also grammatically casual 
 79. Id. at 2837. 
 80. Id. at 2837, n.6. 
 81. Id. at 2838. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2839. Distinguishing a precedent that the majority has invoked, Kagan again 
speaks in the first person to underscore her point that the majority’s reading of that precedent 
actually supports her own position as well. “Let me be clear,” she tells the reader, “[t]his is 
not my own idiosyncratic or post hoc view.” Id. at 2840. 
 84. Id. at 2835. 
 85. 132 S. Ct. 476, 479 (2011). 
 86. Id. at 479. 
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in its use of a conjunction to end the sentence. She offers no adjective to contrast 
with “complex,” trusting the reader to understand her point. It is here that Kagan 
uses the coin-flipping analogy discussed earlier to underscore the disturbingly 
random quality of the current standard, a problem that even non-lawyers can 
readily grasp.87  
In another unanimous opinion, this one finding no abuse of discretion in a 
district court’s denial of a prisoner’s request for new counsel, Kagan is faced with 
the need “to fill [a] statutory hole” by selecting an appropriate standard for deciding 
requests by capital defendants.88 She rejects the prosecution’s proposed new theory 
in favor of applying the existing capital standard to non-capital defendants. 
“Inventiveness is often an admirable quality,” she observes, “but here we think the 
State overdoes it.” 89 Instead, “we prefer to copy something familiar than concoct 
something novel.”90 The pairing of the two alliterative verbs—the straightforward 
“copy” with the pejorative “concoct”—alerts the reader to the contrast between the 
two strategies. Where one prudently adopts an established test, the other invents a 
new test that may prove to have unexpected consequences. These epigrammatic 
comments reflect Kagan’s belief that even technical legal issues can often be both 
resolved and expressed without resort to needlessly complicated formulations. Her 
diction reinforces her point: the prosecution “overdoes it” by introducing an 
unnecessary risk while the unanimous Court chooses the simpler and safer course. 
 Through her rhetorical strategies, Kagan has accomplished a feat in her first two 
Court terms that few of the Court’s Justices have matched. Adapting the classroom 
techniques that engage students by speaking to them in familiar diction and 
imagery, Kagan has crafted a voice that reaches not only those trained in the law 
but also those interested in its impact on their lives and their society. Just as she 
used humor to build bridges at her confirmation hearing, she now uses her 
colloquial style to put a human face on what, in the absence of cameras in the 
courtroom, has largely remained an aloof and austere institution. As Jeffrey Rosen, 
an early Kagan admirer, puts it, “her dissents often read like a really good New 
York Times op-ed.”91 Like that really good op-ed, her opinions bridge the gap 
between legal doctrine and its practical consequences for her readers, allowing the 
Court’s broad national constituency of non-lawyers to grasp both the reasoning and 
the result of its decisions. If, as Kagan intends, her style allows her to reach lay 
readers, the Court’s most junior Justice may well turn out to be its most effective 
communicator, a valuable link between those who decide the law and those who are 
bound by it. 
 87. See supra notes 47–48.  
 88. Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276, 1284 (2012). 
 89. Id. at 1285.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Jeffrey Rosen, Strong Opinions, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 28, 2011), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/magazine/92773/elena-kagan-writings. For 
another appreciation of Kagan’s prose style, see Stanley Fish, A Dollar Is a Dollar: Elena 
Kagan’s Style, N.Y. TIMES, (April 11, 2011, 8:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.
com/2011/04/11/a-dollar-is-a-dollar-elena-kagans-style/. 
                                                                                                                 
 
